Current Affairs · · GS2 · International Relations

US defence shift to burden-sharing: what it means for India

An opinion piece reviews the record of Elbridge Colby, the senior Pentagon policy official behind the 2026 US National Defense Strategy, which puts homeland defence, deterring China and greater burden-sharing by allies first. The author argues this gives India leverage in defence technology and co-production. Dependence on imports and divergent interests limit it.

Event date:

REq1
  1. Context1 / 5
    • A recent opinion piece assesses Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's Under Secretary for Policy, at the mid-point of his term, and asks what his approach means for India.
    • The 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS), released on 23 January 2026, sets four priorities in order:
      1. defending the US homeland;
      2. deterring China in the Indo-Pacific "through strength, not confrontation";
      3. increasing burden-sharing with allies and partners;
      4. strengthening the US defence-industrial base.
    • The core shift is away from the US acting as the main security provider, towards capable regional partners carrying more of the load.
    • The author argues that India can turn its strategic importance into military, technological and economic leverage, while keeping its strategic autonomy.
  2. Key highlights2 / 5
    • China-focused deterrence. The NDS aims to stop any power, including China, from dominating the US or its allies, and it expects a larger role from regional partners.
    • India's geography. India sits astride the Indian Ocean sea lanes and shares a border with China. That gives it weight in Indo-Pacific security, and the Quad (India, the US, Japan and Australia) is a platform for maritime and supply-chain cooperation.
    • Convergence, not alignment. India and the US share concerns about coercive Chinese behaviour, but differ on Russia, West Asia and other questions. India keeps its defence ties with Russia while deepening cooperation with Washington.
    • Different expectations. The US wants partners to contribute more to regional deterrence. India seeks capability mainly to keep its own decisions independent.
  3. Note3 / 5

    The data behind the constraints

    Figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) show both India's diversification and its continuing dependence on imports. The time periods differ from one series to the next.

    • India's rank among arms importers, 2021-25. Second, after Ukraine.
    • India's share of global major-arms imports, 2021-25. 8.2%, though some reports give 8.3%.
    • Change in India's arms imports, 2016-20 to 2021-25. Down 4%.
    • Russia's share of India's arms imports. 70% in 2011-15, 51% in 2016-20, and 40% in 2021-25.
    • Other leading suppliers to India, 2021-25. France 29%, Israel 15%.
    • India's military expenditure, 2025. $92.1 billion, the fifth largest in the world.

    The Russian legacy. Russia is still India's largest supplier, even though its share has fallen. Replacing Russian systems quickly could create maintenance and interoperability problems.

    A new dependence risk. Buying more American systems could create fresh exposure in logistics, software, spares and upgrades.

    The lesson. Switching suppliers does not by itself deliver autonomy. Domestic capability does.

  4. Way forward4 / 5

    These are the author's suggestions, not approved policy.

    • From buyer to co-developer. Give priority to joint research, technology transfer, co-production and Indian-owned intellectual property. The GE Aerospace and HAL engine cooperation for the LCA Mk2, and the INDUS-X platform for defence start-ups, are examples.
    • Critical technologies. The India-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) covers artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technology and advanced communications.
    • Supply chains. India can gain from efforts to build alternatives to China-centred manufacturing, including in semiconductors and critical minerals.
    • Maritime power. Invest in submarines, unmanned systems, surveillance and maritime-domain awareness, so that India can provide security in the Indian Ocean without treaty commitments.
    • Multi-alignment. Deepen ties with the US while keeping partnerships with France, Japan, Australia, Europe, Russia and the Gulf. Membership of the Quad, BRICS and the SCO at the same time reflects this.
    • Reciprocal interdependence. Offer manufacturing capacity, market access and regional capability in return for technology and investment.
  5. Note5 / 5

    The PSIR lens

    Proposition tested: that US burden-sharing pushes India towards alignment with Washington.

    • The reading that it pushes India towards alignment. Shared concern over China; the Quad; iCET; and a growing US and Western share of India's arms imports.
    • The reading that it preserves autonomy. Russia remains the largest supplier; India keeps its BRICS and SCO ties; and India differs with the US on Russia and West Asia.

    The missing variable is capability. Realist thinkers expect states to balance against a rising power, and burden-sharing is how a leading power asks its partners to do more of that balancing. But a partner that depends on imports has less room to bargain. India's own defence and technology base therefore decides whether convergence with the US becomes leverage or dependence.

    Synthesis. The evidence points to issue-based convergence, not alliance. Autonomy rises with India's own capability, not with a change of supplier.

    This card sets out documented positions. It does not adjudicate between them.

Sources

Syllabus

PaperSubjectSub-topic
GS2International RelationsIndia and its relations with major powers; effect of policies and politics of developed countries on India's interests
GS3Internal SecurityDefence: indigenisation of technology
PSIRInternational RelationsTheories of international relations: realism, balance of power, alliance and burden-sharing; India-US relations and strategic autonomy
PrelimsInternational RelationsInternational relations in news; the Quad; iCET; SIPRI data

Topics

External Sector of IndiaInternational Relations and Current AffairsDefence TechnologyInformation and Communication Technology

Practice questions

  1. With reference to SIPRI's data on arms transfers for 2021-25, consider the following statements: 1. India was the world's second-largest importer of major arms. 2. Russia remained India's largest arms supplier. 3. Russia's share of India's arms imports was higher than in 2016-20. Which of the statements given above are correct?

    1. 1 and 2 only
    2. 2 and 3 only
    3. 1 and 3 only
    4. 1, 2 and 3
    Show answer

    Answer: A. Statements 1 and 2 are correct: India was the second-largest importer of major arms in 2021-25, after Ukraine, and Russia remained its largest supplier. Statement 3 is wrong, because Russia's share of India's arms imports fell from 51% in 2016-20 to 40% in 2021-25, continuing a decline from 70% in 2011-15.

    Difficulty: medium · statement

  2. Consider the following statements about the 2026 US National Defense Strategy: 1. It ranks defence of the US homeland as the first priority. 2. It calls for greater burden-sharing by allies and partners. 3. It commits the US to a formal military alliance with India. Which of the statements given above are correct?

    1. 1 and 3 only
    2. 2 and 3 only
    3. 1 and 2 only
    4. 1, 2 and 3
    Show answer

    Answer: C. Statements 1 and 2 are correct: homeland defence is listed first among the four priorities, and burden-sharing with allies and partners is the third. Statement 3 is wrong, because India and the US have a partnership built on specific agreements and initiatives, not a treaty alliance, and India has not accepted any mutual defence commitment.

    Difficulty: easy · statement

  3. Consider the following statements: 1. Strategic autonomy means India decides its positions issue by issue rather than as part of a bloc. 2. India is a member of the Quad, BRICS and the SCO at the same time. 3. Changing arms suppliers by itself guarantees strategic autonomy. Which of the statements given above are correct?

    1. 1 and 2 only
    2. 2 and 3 only
    3. 1 and 3 only
    4. 1, 2 and 3
    Show answer

    Answer: A. Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is wrong, because autonomy rests on domestic capability rather than on diversifying suppliers alone: replacing one supplier with another simply moves the dependence, since logistics, software, spares and upgrades still come from outside.

    Difficulty: medium · statement

Mains practice

Answer-writing practice on this article. Attempt it first, then open the hints.

  1. GS2 · 250 words

    The US expects capable partners to carry more of the security burden in the Indo-Pacific. Examine the opportunities and risks this creates for India.

    Show hints
    1. Set out the four priorities of the 2026 National Defense Strategy, and the shift from the US as principal security provider to partners carrying more of the load.
    2. Explain why India's position astride the Indian Ocean sea lanes and its border with China make it central to that calculation.
    3. Cover the opportunities: co-production, technology transfer and Indian-owned intellectual property, with iCET and defence start-up platforms as vehicles.
    4. Set against this the Russian legacy: 40% of arms imports in 2021-25, and the maintenance and interoperability cost of replacing those systems quickly.
    5. Conclude on the central risk, that buying more American equipment substitutes one dependence for another unless domestic capability grows alongside it.
  2. PSIR · 250 words

    "Burden-sharing turns partners into instruments of a great power’s balancing strategy." Critically examine with reference to India-US relations.

    Show hints
    1. Open with the realist expectation that states balance against a rising power, and locate burden-sharing as a leading power distributing that balancing effort.
    2. Give the evidence for the proposition: convergence on China, the Quad, iCET, and a rising Western share of India’s arms imports.
    3. Give the evidence against it: Russia as the largest supplier, simultaneous membership of BRICS and the SCO, and divergence on Russia and West Asia.
    4. Argue that capability is the variable that decides between the two readings, since a partner dependent on imports has little room to bargain.
    5. Conclude with a synthesis: issue-based convergence rather than alliance, with autonomy rising from an indigenous base rather than a change of supplier.